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Introduction

Jacques Maritain’s keen philosophical genius
has run the gamut of philosophical inquiry.

No

branch of philosophy has escaped his penetrating
analysis.

The Degrees of Knowledge, published in

1932, is perhaps his greatest work.

In this his

power for speculative reasoning reaches its high
est perfection, .His Art and Scholasticism, the
final result of his earlier serious study of art
and poetry— a work opening up new vistas for ar
tists and critics alike— has already become a
classic in the field of aesthetics.

His later

works are developments of his social and polit
ical thought and have been occasioned by his
growing awareness that the order of speculative
thought, based as it is on reality, must somehow
impregnate social and political life.

This very

order and development that we see in Maritain’s
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philosophy witnesses to his eudaemonism as dis
tinguished from the deontologism of most of his
contemporaries.

Freedom in the Modern World and

True Humanism are the most complete expressions
of his mature social and political thought, and
added insights may be gained from his most recent
works Scholasticism and Politics, The Rights of
Man and natural L a w , and Christianity and Democ
racy.
Althotigh his first interests were chiefly
metaphysics and aesthetics, Maritain was also
very conscious of the practical problems to be
solved in the society in which he lived.
is only what we would expect of him.

This

Speaking

of the true metaphysician, he says that ”he must
not be exclusively an intellect.

His equipment

of senses must be in good order.

He must be keen

ly and profoundly aware of sensible objects.

And

he should be plunged into existence, steeped ever
more deeply in it by a sensuous and aesthetic per
ception as acute as possible, and by experiencing
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the suffering and struggles of real life, so that,
aloft in the third heaven of natural understand
ing, he may feed upon the intelligible substance
of things."1

As a result of this interest in life,

in people, and in things, Maritain soon became pro
foundly aware of the chaotic conditions of the mod
ern world with its Cartesian idealism and Rousseauan naturalism.

For him, "the disease afflicting

the modern world is in the first place a disease
of the mind.,T^

Man as an intellectual creature

is superior to vegetative and sensitive creatures,
but nevertheless he is at the lowest level of in
tellectuality.

He does not intuit things as do

the angels, but rather he is dependent for his
knowledge, at least extrinsically, on external
things, from which the intellect abstracts the
intelligible form..

All knowledge, then, must be

based on the nature of things.

Maritain had found

such-a knowledge in the philosophy of St. Thomas
Aquinas, the great medieval master who had built
on the solid rock of Aristotelian metaphysics his
1. J. Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysios, p. 23-24.
2. J. Maritain, The Angelic Doctor, p. 90.
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great philosophic synthesis.

After a profound

study of St. Thomas’ -works, he determined to de
velop and to apply the principles of his phil
osophy to the problems of the day— MVae mihi si
non thomistizavero.’’-5- In this vocation Maritain
has become a creative writer in himself, drawing
out the hidden implications of fundamental prin
ciples found in Aristotle and St. Thomas and apply
ing them to the concrete historical circumstances
of the modern world.
Great, however, as is the respect with which
Maritain’s thought is always received in philos
ophic circles, many worshipers of the Myth of Pro
gress object that he is lost in out-moded medieval
speculation and that therefore his conclusions
must of necessity be vacuous.

Mhritain himself

seems to have anticipated this objection and noth
ing could be more convincing in refuting it than
his own words from his AntImoderne, one of his
first books as he set out on his new mission:
wJe n'ai pas besoin de dire qu’il ne s’agit pas la

1. J. Maritain, Antimoderne. p. 14.
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non pins d ’un attachement servile a saint Thomas et a
Aristote, et d'nne maniere de philosopher qni consisterait a rlp^ster leurs formules d'nne fagon mlcanique.
II s’agit d ’nne fidllite spirituelle et filiale. qui
fait ehercher dans lenrs principes activement mlditis,
groupes, coordonnes, le moyen de decouvrir, d'inventer
la solution des problernes nouveaux qni peuvent se poser
de nos jours, et cela grace a un effort original de
1*esprit. Car c'est implicitement et virtuellement.
ce n ’est pas explicitement que ces principes contiennent la reponse a tout nouveau probleme philosophique,
ou plut8t aux nouvelles determinations et aux nouveaux
modes que les eternels problemes philosophiques peuvent
recevoir de nos jours.

Maritain assails the false view that philosophy
must strive in every respect for the new as oppos
ed to the old.

Development in philosophy consists

in a deeper penetration of the same eternal prin
ciples— "Real development is not leaving things be
hind, as on a road, btit drawing life from them as
from a root.

Even when we improve we never progress.

For progress, the metaphor from the road, implies a
man leaving his home behind him:

but improvement

means a man exalting the towers and extending the
gardens of his horne.'1^

Maritain strives for the in

forming of the changing historical circumstances of
the modern world by the eternal principles found in
Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas in a manner analogous
1. J. Maritain, Antimoderne. p. 135-134.
2. G. K. Chesterton, The Victorian Age in Literature,
p. 12.
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to the informing of an individual matter by a
specific form.

The resultant society, then, will

not be simply an assemblage of new temporal cir
cumstances, nor an assemblage of eternal princip
les, but a composition of the two.
Maritain repeatedly lashes out at the errors
in social and political philosophy arising from
the failure of men to take into account the nature
of things.

In this study, following the scholas

tic tradition, we will give first Maritain’s cri
tique of existing systems— of Liberalism, Capital
ism, Socialism, Communism, and Totalitarianism—
and we will show how his political humanism devel
ops consistently, and almost inevitably, from his
own regard for the nature of things.
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I

C?ritique of Liberalism

Liberalism is that system of thought which
grew up in the eighteenth and nineteenth centur
ies.

It chose as its primary principle that

which the word itself indicates, namely, liberty.
However, liberty for liberalism did not retain
its traditional meaning.

Liberty, correctly un

derstood, is the privilege of creatures endowed
with mind or reason— "Necesse est quod homo sit
liberi arbitrii, ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est."-1*
Liberty, then, is essentially the faculty of be
ing able to choose between the means conducing
to an end, for he who has the faculty of choos
ing one thing among many is master of his act
ions.

For liberalism, however, liberty is some-

thing physical rather than moral.— anyone is free
1. Summa Theologies, I, 83, 1.
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to do, to say or to think -whatever he likes with
out any regard for society, tradition, objective
standards or authority.

The fundamental principle

of liberalism is absolute freedom of speech, press,
politics, conscience and religion.

Liberalism

abandons the social, political and economic order
to the government of a spontaneous nature— its
battle cry is ’laissez-faire; laissez-aller; laissez-passer.”

The State, whose function is pure

ly negative, must not interfere with business,
for to do so would be interference and the des
truction of liberty.

The right to the use of

private property, then, becomes absolute.

Since

might is right for liberalism, private property
is at the mercy of individual whims, and the use
of private property is not restrained by the de
mands of the common good or by any moral consid
erations.
Maritain’s opposition to liberalism is based
on the principle that freedom must be ruled by
right reason; freedom must have a norm and a
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guide— ’’Because of its imperfection— and because,
being subject to becoming we must in all things
begin with the imperfect and little by little
grow up to adult age— human liberty needs to be
protected: that is the important thing....And in
the first place it needed a law or ordinance of
reason, a rule of what to do and what not to do.”l
Maritain cites Leo XlII’s encyclical Llbertas
Praestantissimum in support of his criticism of
liberalism:
’’Nothing more absurd or perverse could
be said or imagined than the statement that
man, being naturally free, ought to be ex
empt from all law; if it were so, the con
sequence would be that it is necessary for
liberty not to be in accordance with rea
son: whereas it is the contrary which is
true, namely, that man ought to be subject
to law precisely because he is by nature
free....Of its very nature then and con
sidered from any angle whatever, in indiv
iduals or societies, in superiors no less
than, in subordinates, human liberty implies
the necessity of obedience to a supreme
eternal rule, which is no other than the
authority of God in His Commandments or
prohibitions to us. This perfectly proper
sovereignty, so far from destroying or im
pairing liberty in any degree, on the con
trary protects it and brings it to its per
fection. For the true perfection of every
being consists in pursuing and attaining
1. J. Maritain, The Things That Are Not Caesar’s ,
p. 135.
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Its end: now the supreme end to which human
liberty should aspire is God.”^Law, then, does not destroy freedom; rather,
it is the pedagogue of freedom— it teaohes us how
to live.

Consequently, in choosing means to his

last end, man must be guided by law and by the de
mands of the common good.

1. Leo XIII, Libertas Praestantissimum.
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II

Critique of Capitalism

In the economic order, Liberalism is known
as Capitalism.

Capitalism has been defined by

Leo XIII as "a system by which great masses of
wage-earners are so subject to capital in the
hands of a few that they are able to divert
business and economic activity to their own ar
bitrary will and advantage, without any regard
for the human dignity of workers, the social
character of economic life, social justice or
the common good."I

The ” spirit” of capitalism

is a spirit of hatred of the poor, of contem
plation, of cultural values, of simplicity, of
humility, of truth.

It exalts the productive

and inventive powers of man.
erial wealth and riches.

Its ”God" is mat

Capitalism pertains

1. Leo XIII, Rerum No varum.
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to the category of quantity— it is concerned
with ever-increased wealth.

It is not concer

ned with quality or with human values.
thing is the object of acquisition.
values suffer.

Every

Internal

All the movements of the soul

and heart are annihilated before the practical
affairs of life.

The dignity of the human per

son and the dignity of work are forgotten in the
face of the supposedly more important problems
of money, riches, production, new techniques of
saving, etc.

True finality is ignored, and with

it philosophy and reason are cast aside.

Man

becomes a slave of matter:
MEounded upon the two unnatural prin
ciples of the fecundity of money and the
finality of the useful, multiplying its
needs and servitudes without any possibil
ity of there ever being a limit, ruining
the leisure of the soul, withdrawing the
material factibile from the control which
proportioned it to the ends of the human
being, imposing on man its puffing machin
ery and its speeding up of matter, the
modern world is shaping human activity in^
a properly inhuman way, in a properly devil
ish direction, for the ultimate end of all
this frenzy is to prevent man from remember
ing G-od,
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dum nil perenne cogitat,
seseque culpis illigat.
He must, consequently, if he is to be log
ical, regard as useless, and therefore des
picable, everything which for any reason
bears the mark of the spirit.
Maritain*s criticism of Capitalism is based
on ethical and spiritual values and on the prim
ary social value of human personality.

He insists

that the rational life of man is ordered to the
accomplishment of true freedom of autonomy.

Al

though the type of economy which lies at the base
of the capitalist regime is not in abstract prin
ciple or in its ideal scheme fundamentally immor
al, as Marx thought, it must be confessed Mthat
in point of fact, and tested not only by its id
eal operation but also by the spirit it has shown
in history and by the actual ways in which this
spirit has become manifest in the institutions
of human society, the capitalist regime is wedded
to the unnatural principle of the fertility of
money.1,2 Maritain’s most basic condemnation of
this unnatural principle at the base of the cap
italist economy is found in his book Religion
1. J. Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 37.
2. 1. Maritain, 'Freedom in the Modern World,
p. 127.
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and Culture?
’’Instead of being considered as a mere
feeder enabling a living organism, which the
productive undertaking is, to procure the
necessary material and equipment, money has
come to be considered the living organism
and the undertaking with its human activit
ies as the feeder and instrument of money;
so that the profits cease to be the normal
fruit of the undertaking fed with money,
and become the normal fruit of money fed
by the undertaking. "Values have been re
versed and the immediate consequence is to
give the rights of dividend precedence over
those of wages and salary and to establish
the whole economy under the supreme regul
ation of the laws and the fluidity of the
’sign’ money predominating over the ’thing’ ,
commodities useful to mankind, "lWe must respect the nature of things, and
therefore we must uphold the primacy of quality
over quantity, of work over money, of human over
technical means, of wisdom over science.

1. J . Maritain, Religion and Culture, p. 62.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

page 15

III

Critique of Socialism

Socialism believes in the greatest possible
accumulation of wealth and the equal distribut
ion of it among the members of society.

Priv

ate property, then, is ruled out, and its use
is governed only by the needs of society, with
no moral considerations.

The goods of indiv

iduals would be made common to all, and the men
who preside over a municipality or who direct
the entire State should act as administrators
of these goods.

Socialism pins its faith on

material things, on mechanical industrial arr
angements, on a new economic order which is to
come into being by the operation of material
forces:
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’’Socialism, completely ignoring the
sublime destiny of man and of society, or
not taking it into account at all, supp
oses the human community to be constituted
only with a view to material well-being.”!
It is not in the least interested in the con
scious cultivation of moral qualities and soc
ial virtues.

If it believes in these at all,

it holds that they will be the outcome of the
new economic system.

Its one and chief pre

occupation is to nourish discontent in the
heart of the laborer and to fan the hatred of
the prevailing economic system into a devas
tating flame.
In opposition to Socialism, Maritain main
tains that ”in seeking help for the masses this
principle before all is to be considered as
basic, namely, that private ownership must be
preserved inviolate.”s

Por Maritain, following

St. Thomas, the first principle to be noted
with regard to private property is that all
material things belong to man, considered in
his specific nature, and he has the right of
1. Pius XI, Q.uadragesimo Anno.
S. Leo XIII, Rerum No varum.
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appropriation:
".....et sio habet homo naturale do
minium exteriorum rerum, quia per rationem et voluntatem potest uti rebus exterioribus ad suam utilitatem, quasi propter
se factis; semper enim imperfectiora sunt
propter perfectiora."!
The second principle is that man may best appro
priate material things by individual appropri
ation, that is, by one man owning a certain
specific part of material things:
"The rights of man over material th
ings imply in fact the power to manage,
administer and use these goods."2
In this he follows almost literally St. Thomas
who says:
" .....circa rem exteriorem duo competunt homini. Quorum unum est potestas
procurandi et dispensandi.....Aliud vero
quod competit homini circa res exteriores
est usus ipsarum."3
This power as a rule can be properly exercised
only by individual persons.

Only thus can one

hope to secure the care that is required in the
management of goods.

St. Thomas expresses it

thus:
"Si consideretur iste ager absolute,
1. Summa Theologica, II-II, 66, 1.
Freedom in the Modern World, p. 94.
3. Summa Theologies, II-II, 66, S.
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non habet unde magis sit hujus quarn illius;
sed^si consideretur per respectum ad opportunitatem colendi et ad pacificum usum agri,
secundum, hoc habet quandam coramensuratipnem.
ad hoc quod sit unius et non alterius.’1^
Maritain then proceeds to determine more pre
cisely what are the elements in human nature on
which the general right to own property is found
ed; what is it in human nature that calls for the
individual appropriation of material goods?

He

finds this general postulate in the activity of
man as maker— or as artist in the broad sense of
the word— an activity which springs from the
very essence of personality.
According to him, the nature of man admits of
two different activities.

There is the poetic

activity, or activity concerned with the making
of things, and the object of this is the faotibile, the thing to be male or produced.

Man is

an ”artist” in the sense that he fashions mater
ial things, and moulds them to his liking.

There

is also the ethical or practical activity, and
the object of this is the agibile, or the thing
to be done.

Now, it is the artistic or poetic

!• Summa Theologica, II-II, 57, 4.
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activity of man, requiring as it does a faotibile, which is the metaphysical basis for the
individual appropriation of property— if man is
to make something or fashion something, he can
best do this by owning the material to be fash
ioned or made.

It is the ethical or practical

activity of man which limits the use by an in
dividual of a specific piece of material or
property.
An individual man, then, may own private
property, but his use of it is not absolute—
the function and purpose of the property must
be considered; the rights of others must be
considered; the common good must be considered.
The essential thing to remember is that proper
ty must be governed by reason— function and
purpose determine its" use.

There are no static

rules for different holdings of property; uni
versal principles must be applied analogically
to different concrete circumstances.

Thus Mar

itain, appealing as usual to the nature of man
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and of things, defends the right to private
property and the right to the relative, func
tional use of private property.
Socialism is to be rejected, too, for com
pletely ignoring the relationship between God
and man.

It refuses to see in man the creature

and image of G-od.

Socialism may admit that God

exists, but it "makes of God Himself an idol,
because it denies in act, if not in word, the
nature and transcendence of God."-1- In this Mar
itain has the approval of Pius II who says:
"Society, then, as Socialism dreams of
it, cannot, on the one hand exist, or even
come into being, without the use of mani
festly excessive compulsion and, on the
other hand, enjoys a license no less false,
since in it no room is found for true soc
ial authority, which cannot be founded on
temporal or material interests, but descends
from God alone, Creator and Last End of all
things."2

1. J. Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, p. 13.
B. Pius XI, O.uadragesimo Anno.
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IT

Critique of Communism

Communism is based on the principles of dia
lectical and historical materialism advocated by
Marx.

According to Maritain, the social solut

ions of Communism, which are concerned with la
bor organization and the secular community, can
not be taken apart from atheism, which has to do
with religion and metaphysics, maintaining rather
that ’’Communism as it exists— above all the Comm
unism of the Soviet republics— is a complete sys
tem of doctrine and life which claims to reveal
to man the meaning of his existence, to answer
all the fundamental questions which are set by
life, and which manifests an unequalled power of
totalitarian inclusiveness.’’-1- it is, then, not
merely an economic system alone, but a ’’philosophy
1. J. Maritain, True Humanism, p. 28.
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of life based on a coherent and absolute rejec
tion of divine transcendence, a discipline of
life and a mysticism of integral revolutionary
m a t e r i a l i s m . M a t t e r is the only reality in
the world.

Human society itself is nothing

but a phenomenon and form of matter.

Matter

is a dynamic and active thing, and this dy
namism will of itself inevitably bring to ac
tuality man and mind and human society and the
perfection of human society.

Since there is no

difference between soul and body, man has no
liberty or human dignity.

All rights of the

individual are subordinate to the common good.
Absolute equality of individuals is preached,
thus rejecting all hierarchy and authority.
All forms of private property are ruled out—
the title to, and the use of, private property
should be in common.

Based on these material

istic tenets of Communism, human society would
be rta collectivity with no other hierarchy than
that of the economic system.

It would have only

1. J. Maritain, Christianity and Democracy, p. 82.
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one mission: the production of material things
by means of collective labor, so that the goods
of this world might be enjoyed in a paradise
where each would ’give according to his powers’
and would ’receive according to his needs’.”!
Morality and law would be divorced from their
metaphysical foundations, and would become in
stead ephemeral derivations of the economic or
der.

The existence of any eternal truths is

rejected— there are no values which transcend
either the individual or time or space.

There

is no place for the person as the ultimate norm
of spiritual existence and for his proper val
ues, freedom and love.

Rather, the person is

utterly and absolutely subordinate, in all that
he is and has, to whatever povers are above him.
The State, too, must be abolished.

Denying

the social nature of man, Communism rejects the
family as the first societal form, and, as a
necessary consequence, rejects the State also.
The whole social order must be overthrown, and
1. Pius XI, Atheistic Communism,,
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in its place an entirely new order must arise.
The exploitation of the poor and the oppressed
majority by the privileged minority in the Cap
italist economy must be violently opposed.

The

"exploited" must wage a bitter war against the
"exploiter", bringing him down from his high
level of wealth, power and influence.

Finally,

when all are levelled off, when there are no
longer any exploiters who need the protection
of the State, society will be a single classless
class, and the State will disappear.
Maritain’s criticism of Communism is based
again on the nature of man and of things.

Acc

ording to him, "St. Thomas.... shows by five
different arguments how? the conclusion ’G-od ex
ists’ is imposed with absolute necessity on the
human reason."-1- We see in the world things cap
able of being and not being, things graded in
degrees of perfection, things disposed tow?ards
an object or end.

To account for all this, "we

are compelled....to admit a Cause which moves
without being moved, causes without being caused,
1. J. Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy,
p . £58.
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cannot lack existence, contains in its purity
the perfection of which things partake in great
er or less degree, possesses an intellect which
is the final ground of all natures and the first
principle of all things.

Such a Cause we term

’God’; it is pure act, deriving its existence
from itself (a se).”-®- Man, admittedly a mater
ial body, is nevertheless endowed with a form
or a soul, immaterial and spiritual, and there
fore nobler, capable of reason and free-will.
Matter, then, is not the only reality:
’’Marx saw- the essential importance of
material causality, but he made it purely
and simply primary.”2
By reason of his,intellect and will, each indiv
idual person possesses certain liberties and cer
tain rights.

Not all of the rights of the indiv

idual are subordinate to the common good.

By re

ason of certain things that are in him, by reason
of the fact that he is an individual of a species,
man in his entirety wrould belong to society, but
not by reason of himself as a whole:
1. An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 258.
2. True Humanism, p. 37.
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’’Homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum se toturn et secundum omnia
sua.M 1
By reason of still other things that are in him,
by reason of the ordering of the personality as
such to the absolute, man transcends society:
”Totum quod homo est, et quod potest et
habet, ordinandum est ad Deum; et ideo omnis
actus hominis bonus vel malus habet rationem
meriti vel demeriti apud Deum, quantum est
ex ipsa ratione actus.”2
The Communist demand for absolute equality
and for a classless society is not in accord
with human nature.

Pope Leo XIII, in his ency

clical Rerum No varum, which Maritain quotes re
peatedly, says:
”Let it be laid down, in the first place,
that humanity must remain as it is. It is
impossible to reduce human society to a level
....There naturally exist among mankind in
numerable differences of the most important
kind; people differ in capability, in dili
gence, in health, and in strength; and un
equal fortune is a necessary result of in
equality in condition.”3
It is true that men are equal in so far as each
man is possessed of a human nature, created by
G-od and destined for G-od, but in his individual
1. Summa Theologica, I-II, 21, 4, ad 3.
2. Ibid.
3. Leo XIII, Rerum No varum.
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potentialities and actualities each individual
man differs from every other man.

Inequalities

of all kinds, then, exist by the very nature of
things, and the Communist ideal of establishing
a classless society is impossible of attainment.
Communism, so intent on abolishing all ex
ploitation, concludes illogically that all ex
ploitation is the result of private ownership.
Rather, exploitation is the result of the abuse
of the right to private property.

We have al

ready given Maritain’s defence of private pro
perty by a metaphysical argument.

Briefly, ag

ain, the argument is that ” individual owner
ship of material goods is based on a spiritual
foundation, on the capacity of the rational be
ing as an intellectual substance to give form
to matter.’1^

1. Freedom in the Modern World, p. 211.
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Y

Critique of Totalitarianism

Maritain says of Totalitarianism that ”we
may call ’totalitarian’ any conception in which
the politic community,— whether it be the State
in the strict sense of the word or the organized
collectivity,— claims the entire man for itself,
either to shape or to be the end of all his act
ivities, or indeed to be in itself the essence
of his personality and his dignity.

Thus, accor'

ding to Signor Mussolini, the State is ’the ver
itable reality of the individual’; the Fascist
State is ’the highest and most potent form of
personality’; ’nothing human or spiritual, in
so far as it has any value, exists outside the
State; ’its principle, the directing inspiration
of human personality joined in one society,
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penetrates into the soul....the soul of the soul.’”^No totalitarian regime, whether it be Fascism, Naz
ism or any other concrete expression of totalitar
ian principles, recognizes any organized limitat
ion of the political realm and power.

Totalitar

ianism subjects all things,— material as well as
spiritual and moral,— to the State.

Everything

exists for the State— the State is supreme in ev
erything.

The religious and ethical basis of pol

itics is rejected; power politics is the ’’ultimate
end” ; the State is not only the ’’societas perfecta”
in its own order but the ’’societas perfecta” in an
absolute sense.

The State is the present god; the

racial substance of the people or the national myth
or the classless society decide exclusively what
the common good is.

The State determines exclusive

ly the aim of education and the aim of marriage. In
short, Totalitarianism insists that the State is
supreme in everything.
Maritain’s criticism of Totalitarianism is based
again on the nature of man.
1. True Humanism, p. 128, Note 2.
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’’Fascism... .has as metaphysical root an
absolute pessimism of a rather voluntaristic
ana Machiavellian sort. Practically, it de
nies that man comes from the hands of G-od,
and that he maintains within him, in spite
of everything, the grandeur and dignity of
such an origin. This pessimism, which in
vokes incontestable empirical truths, turns
these truths into ontological lies, because
it is indifferent to the fact that man comes
from God. Then it despairs of man— I mean
of the human person, the individual person—
in favor of the State. Not God but the State
will create man; the State by its constraints
will oblige man to come forth from the noth
ingness of the anarchy of the passions, and
lead an upright and even heroic life.”!
For Maritain, as for Aristotle and St. Thomas
Aquinas, man is a social and political animal.
The human person craves social and political life,
not only with regard to the family community, but
also with regard to the civil community.

Man

tends, then, by his very nature to social life
and to communion, not only because of the needs
of human nature, by reason of which each one of
us has need of others for his material, intell
ectual and moral life, but also because of the
desire of that human nature to express itself
to others in acts of intelligence and love.

As

a person, man is an individual substance of a
1. Scholasticism and Politics, p. IE.
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rational nature, more a whole than a part and
more independent than servile.

No?;, by reason

of certain things that are in him, by reason of'
the fact that he is an individual of a species,
man in his entirety vrould belong to society,
but not by reason of himself as a whole.

By re

ason of still other things that are in him, by
reason of the ordering of his personality as
such to the absolute, man transcends society.
Totalitarianism, then, is false, based as it is
on a false notion of the nature of man and of
society.

The distinction bet?«en the individual

and the person and the implications of the not
ion of personality will be discussed at greater
length shortly as the fundamental principle of
Maritain’s own social philosophy.
We have seen how Maritain bases his criti
cism of Liberalism, Capitalism, Socialism, Comm
unism and Totalitarianism, on the nature of man
and of things.

His arguments are almost wholly

metaphysical, and when he resorts to arguments
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from expediency, it is merely to substantiate
the metaphysical arguments.
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71

Maritain’s Political Humanism

Maritain’s own conception of political soc
iety is "based... .upon the reality of human nat
ure and the human person, and it develops from
its own principles in a necessary manner.’*-*- He
himself calls it a ’’humanist political philosophy,
or a political humanism.’*2

Before proceeding to

show in detail the development of Maritain’s th
ought from the nature of things, it will be best,
for the sake of clarity and perspective, to men
tion the keynotes of the system.

Maritain’s soc

iety, then, would be personalist, communal, plur
alist , and founded on the ordered relationship
of the spiritual and the temporal.
The basic principle of Maritain’s whole soc
ial philosophy is the distinction between the
1. J. Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural L a w ,
p . 50.
2. Ibid.
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individual and the person.

Man is an individual,

but he is also a person, and, by drawing out all
the hidden implications of this distinction, Maritain fashions his political humanism.

The dis

tinction is not a new one— "it is indeed a classic
distinction, belonging to the intellectual heri
tage of humanity."-5- It is fundamental in the doc
trine of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Maritain, however,

is one of the first Thomists to apply the distin
ction in all its fulness to social problems:
"After attempting to explain how man is
as a whole an individual and also as a whole
a person, and how at the' same time the focus
of individuality is quite distinct from that
of personality, I will consider the appli
cations of this distinction, especially in
social matters."*3
Man is an individual, just as any other re
ality outside the mind is an individual.

Within

the mind things are in a state of universality;
outside the mind things are in a state of indiv
iduality.

Material things are individual.

gels, too, are individual essences.

An

The Divine

Essence itself is supremely individual.

In the

1* Scholasticism and Politics, p. 58.
E. Ibid., p. 56.
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case of pure spirits, of pure forms unalloyed
with any matter, the very form itself is the
principle of individuation.

But, according to

St. Thomas Aquinas, in the case of material
beings composed of matter and form, and there
fore in man, the principle of individuation is
matter— "materia signata". Matter is the prin
ciple of division; it seeks to occupy a certain
position, to have quantity, to be determined.
By matter, Maritain, following St. Thomas, un
derstands prime matter— materia prima— "able
neither to be nor to be thought by itself, and
from which all corporeal beings are made.M^
Prime matter in itself is nothing actual; it
is a principle in itself wholly indeterminate,
incapable of separate existence, but capable
of being actualized or ’informed’ by a form—
this form being an active principle determin
ing the prime matter, constituting with it
one single thing actually existing, making it
to be this or that particular thing.
1. Scholasticism and Politics, p. 60.
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Man, then, is an individual substance made
up of matter and form, of body and soul.

Des

cartes maintained that the soul— thought— was
one thing, complete in itself, and that the
body— extension— was another thing, complete
in itself.

But this is not so.

Rather, body

and soul are two substantial co-principles, in
complete in themselves, uniting to form one com
plete being, man.

For Maritain, therefore,

following St. Thomas, man, as every other cor
poreal being, has prime matter as the metaphy
sical root of his individuality.
Man, however, while admittedly an animal
and an individual, is unlike other animals or
individuals.

Man is an individual endowed with

intellect and will, and therefore a person—
’’persona est individua substantia naturae rationabilis.”'*' The metaphysical root of person
ality lies in the subsistence of a spiritual
nature.

Through his intellect and will, man

transcends matter; he is a small world unto
himself, he is responsible for his activities,
1. Boethius, The Theological Tractates, ed. by
H.F. Stewart and E. K . hand, p. 84.
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unlike anything else in the world; he becomes
more independent than servile, more a whole
than a part, more spiritual than physical—
’’the person is a reality, which, subsisting
spiritually, constitutes a universe by itself
and an independent whole (relatively independ
ent ), in the great whole of the universe and
facing the transcendent Ifhole, which is God.”1
Of all God’s creatures, man most closely re
sembles the Creator--”persona significat id
quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, sci
licet subsistens in rational! natura.”^

Man

is the very image of God, for God is pure
spirit, and man, possessed of a spiritual nat
ure, capable of knowing and loving, and endow
ed with the life of grace, may know and love
God as He knows and loves Himself.

It is im

portant to note, however, that while man is a
person, he is not a pure person, just as he is
not a pure spirit—
’’The notion of person is an analogous
notion which is realized in different
1. Scholasticism and Politics, p. 63.
2 . Summa Theologies, I-II, 29, 3.
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degrees and on essentially different planes
of ontological being.
Man, possessed of intellect and m i l ,

is at the

highest level of animality, but also at the low
est level of intellectuality, because the intell
ectual form in man informs matter and is there
fore subject to all the weaknesses of individ
uation by "materia signata".

Man, then, at the

lowest level of intellectuality, is also at the
lowest level of personality, since the intellect
or spirit, as we have seen, is the metaphysical
root of personality.

For this reason, "person

ality in the case of man is precarious and al
ways in peril and must be achieved by a kind of
progress."2
Man, then, has two metaphysical aspects— he
is at one and the same time both an individual
and a person.
ate things.

These, again, are not -two separ
There is not in man one reality

called individuality and another reality called
personality.

The same being is, in one sense,

an individual, and, in another sense, a person.
1. Freedom in the Modern World, p. 47.
2. Ibid., p. 48.
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Both the individual and the person are present
and active in each of man’s actions, because
activity is ascribed to subsisting wholes, and
not merely to the parts— ’’Actiones sunt supposit orum” .1
It is not to be thought that individuality,
rooted in matter, and therefore inferior to per
sonality, rooted in spirit, is something bad.
Rather, since material individuality is the very
basis of our existence, it is something good,
but it is precisely because of the natural re
lationship of individuality to personality that
individuality is good.

As long as individuality

submits to the just dexmands of the superior per
sonality, it is good, but, as soon as it reverses
the natural order and seeks to predominate over
personality, then it becomes bad.

It is a trad

itional, and yet very profound, saying in phil
osophy— an expression sometimes attributed to
Pindar— that man must become what he is, and it
is in the nature of things that man is truly a
man when in him the life of spirit and of freedom
1. Summa Theologica, I-II, 77, E ad 1.
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holds sway over the life of the passions and
of the senses; when, indeed, the person rules
the individual.
Maritain makes this classic distinction bet
ween the individual and the person the basis of
his whole social philosophy.

As an individual,

each man has need of his fellow men in order to
realize his destiny in this world.

Man, indeed,

comes into being only by the cooperation of two
human beings, and even after birth he requires
that their union be permanent so that he may
receive the care and attention that he needs
in his early years.

During his life, he re

quires not only the ’hie et nuncf cooperation
of his fellow men, but he is also, at every
turn, making use of the material and spiritual
heritage of all men who have ever, lived.

His

material, intellectual and moral life demands
that he live in society with other men.

As a

person, too, man seeks communion with other
men.

The person seeks to give freely and whole

heartedly; the person strives to use his intellect
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and will in aots of intelligence and love; the
person wants to understand and to love, to be
understood and to be loved.

The person cannot

be alone— ’’....the person requires society both
per abundantlam or as a person, and per indi
gent jam or as an individual.”1

Society, then,

is natural to man, and, without it, man could
not reach his full development or fulfill his
destiny— ’’Homo naturaliter est pars alicujus
multitudinis per quam praestetur sibi auxilium
ad bene vivendum.”^
But what is the relation of man to society?
Society is indeed made up of members as a whole
is made up of parts.

It would seem, therefore,

that the good of the individual is subordinated
to society or to the good of the whole.

But we

must remember that, when we say that man is a
part of society, we do not mean that he bears
the same relation to society as, for example,
a piston to an engine.

The engine is the sole

reason for the existence of the piston— the
piston is designed and made to be a part of an
1. J. Maritain, The Person and the Common Good,
in The R e v i e w of Politics, October 1946, p. 449.
2. Thomas Aquinas, In Decern Libros Ethioorum Aristotelis Ad Nichomaoum Exposltio, p. 3.
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engine.

In itself, it malces no sense outside

or without reference to the engine.

Man, how

ever, as we have seen, while an individual, is
an individual of a rational nature, endowed
with intellect and will.

He is a knowing, self-

governing individual, a master of his actions.
By reason of his immortal soul, he belongs to
an eternal world— ’’the entire person is relative
to the absolute, in which alone it can find its
fulfillment.

Its spiritual fatherland is the

whole order of goods having an absolute value,
and which serve as an introduction to the ab
solute Whole, which transcends the world.’’-1Man as a person, then, possesses eternal values.
Nevertheless, it is true that in this life man,
because of his wants as an individual and of
his generosity as a person, needs society and
becomes, in a very real sense, a part of soc
iety.

Obviously, then, man is both above and

below society.
Maritain finds the solution to this diff
iculty in two principles found in St. Thomas
1. Scholasticism and Politics, p. 64.
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Aquinas.

The first principle is:

"Quaelibet persona singularis comparatur ad totam communitatem sicut pars ad
totum."1
This means that man, by virtue of certain of
his own conditions, by virtue of some of the
realities of his nature is below, and subor
dinate to, society, and therefore exists with
a view to the common good of society.

The

second principle is:
"Homo non ordinatur ad communitatem
politicam secundum se totum et secundum
omnia sua."2
Let us see now how, for Maritain, these
two statements are to be related.

He main

tains that "if the entire man is a part of
political society, he is nevertheless not a
part of political society by virtue of him
self as a whole and by virtue of all that is
in him."3

By reason of certain things which

ara in him, by reason of his wants as an in
dividual and of his generosity as a person,
man is in his entirety a part of political
society.

An example may help us to grasp the

1. Summa Theologlea, II-II, 64, 2.
2. So mm a The olog'i oa, I-II, 21, 4 ad 3.
3. The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 14.
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reality of the distinction.

Just as a runner

is in his whole being a runner and a scientist
in his whole being a scientist, man is in his
entirety a citizen.

Man is a good runner by

means of his neuro-muscular system and a good
scientist by reason of his ability to observe
and calculate.

We cannot separate the runner

or the scientist from the man in a runner or
a scientist.

When we see a runner or a scien

tist coming towards us, we cannot properly say
that the runner or the scientist is coming and
that the man is not coming.

Likewise, a man

is a part of society by reason of his wants
as an individual and of his generosity as a
person, and so the whole man is a part of soc
iety.

Tor this reason, man may even be called

upon to give his life for society.

However, a

runner, though he is a runner in his entirety,
is not a runner, for instance, by reason of his
knowledge of the Bible.

By his knowledge of the

Bible he belongs to a different order.

Likewise,

man, though he is a part of society, is a part
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of society by his needs, not by his relation
to absolute truth and to his ultimate destiny,,
By reason of the ordering of the human person
to these absolute values, each individual man
has rights which exist neither by the State nor
for the State— indeed, in a very real sense,
man transcends all human society.
Having distinguished the individual and the
person, and having seen some of the implications
of the distinction, it is only now that we may
briefly define society.

Society is a grouping

of men to obtain a common end by common effort.
The material cause of society is men.

Society

is made up of individual men, and man, as we
have seen, tends by his very nature to social
life.

The formal cause of society is the gr

ouping of men for a common good.

Society is

not mere multiplicity— in society there must
be a prevailing unity.

This social unity is

to be provided by the common end, which is to
be procured by common effort.
This communal nature of society is one of
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the pivotal points of Maritain’s political hu
manism.

Society is communal, and this means

that society is ordered to a common good which
is specifically different from the sum-total
of the individual goods of individual persons,
and which, at the same time, is nobler than the
individual good, in so far as the individual,
’qua’ individual, is a part of the social whole.
Maritain contends that the common good is not
a mere sum, that it is a new objective good
essentially different from the sum of the goods
of the individuals— it is the good proper to
human persons as persons:
"Tlie common good of society is neither
a mere collection of private goods, nor the
good proper to a whole, which (as in the
case of the species with regard to its in
dividual members, or the hive with regard
to the bees) draws the parts to itself alone,
and sacrifices these parts to itself. It
is the good human life of the multitude, of
a multitude of persons, the good life of
totalities at once carnal and spiritual, and
principally spiritual....
This notion of the common good is the logical
outcome of Maritain’s idea of society as a soc
iety, not merely of individuals, but of persons.
1. The Rights of Man and Hatural L a w , p. 8.
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Since the State is a reality, it must have a
specific mode of being, namely, social being,
and therefore it must have a specific end and
purpose.

Consequently, this end is qualitative

ly distinct from the private good of the indiv
idual and any kind of summation of such private
goods.
"The common good....is the good human life of
the multitude, of a multitude of persons, the
good life of totalities at once carnal and spir
itual,....”

What does this really mean?

We have

seen that men live in society because they have
material and spiritual needs.

The common good,

considered in its material aspects, would in
clude such things as roads, bridges, railways,
canals, etc., which are used by all members of
society.

Factories, too, which manufacture shoes,

automobiles, etc., would be parts of the common
good, because their products are acquired by var
ious members of society for their use.

All nat

ural resources and establishments concerned with
the utilization of natural resources are parts
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of the common good.

But we have seen, too,

that man as a person is a spiritual nature,
and therefore the highest good of man is his
moral and intellectual good.
ganized to serve human beings.

Society is or
’When we say,

therefore, that the common good is principally
the good life of spiritual totalities, we mean
that it is primarily full intellectual and mor
al life, or a communication in intellectual and
moral perfection.

We must make clear, however,

that the fact that ultimately spiritual per
fection is the end of social life does not de
tract from the importance of material goods or
of the economic order in society.

Pius XI calls

the economic order Ma fundamental order5’

and

this statement is justified by the nature of
things.

Man is made up of body and soul, and

his perfection does not consist in getting rid
of the body.

Man is not made of pure spirit.

He is rather made of matter and form, of body
and soul, two substances incomplete in themselves,
uniting to form one complete being.

Por man,

1. Pius XI, Q.uadragesimo Anno.
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then, in his earthly life, the material life
and the spiritual life form one life, in which
the spiritual life should be the specifying,
determining element.
The good of the individual members of soc
iety is subordinate to the common good in pure
ly social matters which concern man’s temporal
happiness:
"Bonum universi est majus quam bonum
particulare unius, si accipiatur utrumque
in eodem genere.”!
The common good, however, does not take preced
ence over the individual good when matters of
grace or conscience, human personal liberties,
or natural rights and duties are involved:
’’Bonum gratiae unius majus est quam
bonum naturae totius universi.”
These values, by reason of man’s orientation as
a person to the absolute, are superior to any
demands of the common good.
The common good, then, is for man an end or
a purpose, but it is not his final end.

The

natural ultimate end of all men is God, and it
1. Summa Theologica, I-II, 113, 9 ad 2.
2. Ibid.
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is essential that the common good respect and
serve the natural order.

Maritain calls the

common good an "intermediate or infravelent
end”

He concedes that the common good is a

final end in a given.order:

"finis ultimus

secundum q u i d ” 2 but in itself relative or sub
ordinate, intermediate or infravelent, to an
absolute final end: "finis ultimus simpliciter” .3
The common good is specifically different from
the absolute final end of man, but it is part
of its very essence that it be subordinated to
that final end.

It is a good and noble end in

itself, but precisely so because of its role as
an intermediate, infravelent end, subordinate
to the ultimate end of man.

It loses its good

ness when it disregards this natural order and
makes of itself an ultimate end.
The application of this concept of final
c

ends in distinct genera to social and political
philosophy is one of Maritain’s most original
contributions.

It witnesses to his keen grasp

of the specific value for our particular time
1. True Humanism, p. 127.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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of a principle formulated, but not fully devel
oped, in the writings of Aristotle and St. Th
omas.

In the words of Dr. Gerald Phelan, a

great admirer and student of Maritain, ’’this
conception of political theory is fraught with
weighty consequences for the doctrine of right
and obligation in its application to the family
and the various social groups within the State, .
to the personal duties of the individual both
as a private person and as a member of society,
as a Christian and as a citizen.”^
Since the absolute final end of man is found
outside, and not within, his intermediate or in
fravelent end, it follows that the common good
of society, or man’s intermediate or infravelent
end, should in some way prepare for the attain
ment of the ultimate end.

The ultimate end of

man is the possession of God, of the order of
absolute values, of the fulness of personal
life and spiritual liberty.

The common good

cannot of itself accomplish the perfect real
ization of this ultimate end of man, for its
1. G. B. Phelan,

Jacques Maritain, p. 27.
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perfect realization requires the very life of
God in man's heart, but the common good should
be truly a means to an end— it should provide
the soil for the intellectual, moral and spir
itual development of all men so that all may
attain to God, to the fulness of personality,
and to perfect spiritual liberty.
A first essential characteristic of the
common good would be its quality of redistri
bution.

This implies that the material and

spiritual wealth of society as a whole should
f l o w back to benefit the individual— the indiv

idual being considered not indeed as a mere
part of the whole existing for the whole, as is
the case in animal societies, but rather as a
person and as a whole within a whole, a ’’finis
cui" in its oiwn right.

The common good of hu

man society implies redistribution to the per
sons as persons.
A second essential characteristic relates
to authority.

For Maritain, authority or gov

ernment flows from the very nature of man and
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of the common good;
" ....the essential function of authority
is a necessary one. The necessity is gr
ounded in the fact that the prudential judg
ment is of an essentially different nature'
from the scientific judgment, that the truth
of prudence consists in the relation of con
formity of the judgment with the require
ments of a right appetite of the end to be
pursued, and that consequently the pruden
tial judgment can never be demonstrated, or
intelie ctually inter sub ject ivized."1
Maritain, then, agrees with Yves Simon that "how
ever conscious the deliberation may be, since it
cannot afford to prove its conclusions, anybody
can, at any time, object that a better course of
action could be conceived, and the unity of ac
tion which is supposed to be required by the pur
suit of the common good will be ceaselessly jeo
pardized unless all members of the community ag
ree to follow one prudential judgment and only
one— which is to submit themselves to some authorO

ity.”

This metaphysical necessity of authority

is expressly sanctioned by Leo XIII:
’’Society can neither subsist nor be con
ceived if there is not a moderator to hold
the balance between Individual wills, to
make of their multitude a unity and to dir
ect them with order to the common g o o d . "5
1. J. Maritain, On Authority in The Review of
Politics. April 194E.
2. Yves Simon, The Nature and Functions of Author
ity, p. 28-29.
3. Leo XIII, Diuturnum Illud.
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Authority, therefore, is essential to soc
iety and is a necessary corollary of the nature
of man and of the common good.

In view of the

function that it must perform, all authority
must be implemented m t h power.

Authority with

out power would become useless and inefficacious.
Authority demands power in order that it may
achieve the common good, while power demands
authority in order that it may even exist:
"What is of absolutely primary importance
is authority. To ’gain power’ is important
for him who wants to act on the community.
To possess or acquire authority,— the right
to be followed by the minds and by the wills
of other men (and consequently the right to
exercise power),-— is more important still.
All authority comes from God, the Creator of
man:
’’Per me reges regnant et legurn conditores
Justa decernunt.”2
lust as, in the physical order, no being whatever
can exercise motion without deriving it from the
First Mover, so also, in the moral order, no man
possesses authority over another, except it be
given to him ultimately by the First Cause of all
1. Scholasticism and Politics, p. 93.
s * Proverbs, VIII, 15.
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being,— God,
Social and political authority, then, is
given a very high place as deriving from God
Himself, but, by the same token, restrictions
are placed upon it.

Since authority comes

from God, it may never act contrary to the
will of God.

Also, authority is not an end

in itself, but a means to an end, and hence
its very validity depends on its being dir
ected to that end, namely, the common good.
It must also respect always the prior claims
of other authorities that derive from God more
immediately.

Consequently, the Church, deriv

ing from God Himself, and immediately related
to man’s final end, should be assisted rather
than hindered by social and political author
ity, which is only mediately related to man’s
final end.

Again, the family is more immed

iately related to m an’s final end than civil
society.
’’The domestic household is antecedent
as well in idea as in fact to the gather
ing together of men into a community* **1
1. Leo XIII, Rerum Ho varum.
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Therefore, social and political authority must
never transgress the prior, and therefore high
er, rights of the family.
Since authority derives immediately from
God, it has a solid foundation which, it would
not have otherwise.

For, if the one exercising

authority spoke in his own name only, his author
ity would suffer from his own limitations and
imperfections.

Then, too, if the one exercis

ing authority spoke as a mere puppet of the peo
ple, his commands would have no sanction other
than the arbitrary decision of the majority:
’’Too often instead of being reason in
writing these laws express no more than the
power of the number and predominant will of
a political party.”•*The ordering of authority to God Who transcends
both the rules and the ruled makes the legitimate
commands.of authority binding in conscience.
Authority, then, necessary because of the very
nature of man and of the common good, ordered as
they are directly to God, must be intrinsically
moral.

It must be exercised in the light of an

1. Leo XIII, Diuturnum Illud.
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awareness of moral good; it exists for the hu
man person; it may not direct the human act
away from the moral good, or towards that which
is in conflict with the moral good.

In seeking

the common good, authority must not be guided
by the mere whims of the ruler and his subjects
but according to the dictates of law and jus
tice :
"Civilization....is ordered to the ’totum
bene vivere’ of the human being, and a right
moral life is the essential thing in this
’bene vivere’."1
That there should be authority in society,
however, does not preclude the existence and
exercise of freedom.

Maritain distinguishes

two meanings of the word "freedom".

There is

freedom of choice and freedom of autonomy.

Fr

eedom of choice means that the will of man,
while it is not free when confronted with God,
the "Summum Bonum", is nevertheless free of all
internal or external constraint in its choice
of intermediate ends or of means to those ends.
In irrational animals, the sensitive appe
tite tends towards the particular, concrete
1. J. Maritain, Theonas, Tr. by F.I. Sheed, p. 154.
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good presented to it by the senses, but it is
not a-ware of any objective quality in the good—
it is not aware of goodness as such, just as it
is not aware of being as such.

In rational

animals, or in man, there is a tendency towards
the universal good as known by the intellect.
Just as the intellect abstracts from the part
icularizing notes of the object and reveals the
objective form of Being, so too it abstracts
and reveals the objective form of Goodness.

It

follows therefore that in man there is a power
of loving and desiring the goodness as such,
and this power is usually called the rational
appetite or will.

It Is clear from our own ex

perience that this rational appetite or will is
free in the choice of intermediate ends or of
means to those ends.

However, St. Thomas also

argues from the nature of man as an intellectual
being that he must be endowed of necessity with
free will.

The argument is that the will is

necessarily directed to some good that is in no
way limited, to some thing which satisfies its
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every desire.

It follows, then, that no inter

mediate or limited good can bind the will by
its necessity.

Because the m i l tends by nat

ure to the infinite and to the "Summum Bonum"
for the perfect fulfillment of all its aspir
ations, it must necessarily be free when con
fronted with finite ends and particular goods
which are entirely incapable of satisfying its
desires.

If man wills such and such a particular

good, he still has the power not to will it.

Man

is free in his choice of all finite things.
The common good of society, then, demands au
thority and the nature of man demands his liber
ty.

How do we reconcile the existence of law,

the concrete expression of authority, with the
existence of liberty in man?

In reality, law is

the pedagogue of liberty— it teaches us how to
live.

Man must live in conformity with the rules

of reason and morality.

The fact that man feels

that he is a free agent is recognized as a valid
argument for the existence of free-will.

The con

verse of the argument, therefore, must surely be
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given weight— namely, that no man feels it an
affront to his sense of liberty that there is
intellectual compulsion, or moral compulsion
arising from conscience.

There is no sense of

constraint in accepting the mathematical fact
that 2 plus 2 equals four.

Similarly, there

is no constraint in accepting the implications
of a moral obligation so long as we understand
and accept the terms of the proposition.

St.

Paul spoke of the freedom with which Christ
made us free,-*- and in another place he speaks
of our ’’reasonable service”^, by which he ob
viously means the service of a free and in
telligent being.

This idea of reasonableness

informs and qualifies the notion of liberty in
the writings of the Pothers, and rightly so,
since the concept of Reason gives full value
to the claims of Lav? which are apt to be min
imized, and even obscured, by those who in
voke the name of Liberty in order to free them
selves from the irksomeness of discipline.
The central paradox is that liberty must be
1. St. Paul, The Epistle to the G-alatians, Ch. 4,
v. 31.
2. St. Paul, The Epistle to the Romans. Ch. 12,
v. 1.
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limited by law or it destroys itself:
"liberty is the right to do that which
the laws do not forbid; for if the citizen
were able to do that which they forbid, it
would no longer be liberty, because others
would have the same power. "1If liberty is to be effective and worthwhile,
it must in its own interests be constrained.
Liberty is a gift of God, "the highest of natur
al endowments";2

but it must be used in accord

ance with the dictates of reason and the precepts
of law.

Between liberty and law there will be

constant stress, and it is the duty of reason to
maintain equilibrium between the inalienable
rights of personal liberty and the legitimate
demands of law.
But, for Maritain, as we have seen, there
is another sense of the word freedom, and this
is freedom of autonomy.

Man possesses freedom,

in the sense of free choice, by reason of his
rational nature, but this freedom of choice is
in reality only the source and spring of the
true world of freedom— freedom in the sense of
freedom of autonomy.

Man is a person, an

1. Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Tr. by
Thomas^Nugent, V.l.,' p. 155
2. Leo XIII, Berum Novarum.
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individual substance of a rational nature, mas
ter of his own actions and of the material world
about him.

Freedom of autonomy consists in the

most complete actualization in the psychological
and moral order of all the potentialities of
man’s metaphysical nature as a person.

The free

man, then, possessing true freedom of autonomy,
would be self-sufficient; he would have to en
dure no external constraint in his own life; he
would have

dominion over his own acts;

and he

would be in himself ”a rounded and a whole
istence.”1

ex

It is evident, then, that freedom of

choice, or freedom in the sense of free will,
has not its own proper end, but it is essentially
directed to the realization of freedom of auto
nomy.

The individual members of society, and

society itself as a whole, should strive for the
progressive realization of this freedom of auton
omy, of that mastery of self and of material th
ings, which is of the very essence of true per
sonality.
stage this

St. Thomas expressed in its embryonic
terminal notion of freedom,

but its

1. Freedomin the Modern World, p. 30.
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precise and formal application to social phil
osophy is one of Maritain’s most original con
tributions.
The pluralistic nature of Maritain’s society
would imply a much more developed form of plural
ism than that of the Middle Ages.

In the medi

eval order, there was a predominant tendency to
wards a strict unitary conception of the social
structure.

Pluralism, in the society Maritain

envisions, would take a different form.

Indeed,

it is in his notion of a pluralistic society
that Maritain makes one of his greatest contri
butions.

He is alive to the diversity of civil

izations and of religions in the modern world.
These different forms are not equivocal, nor in
deed univocal, but rather analogical— they are
alike in some respects and unlike in other re
spects.

Maritain is the first philosopher to

apply the principle of pluralism to the hither
to unequaled heterogeneity of modern social and
political life.
There would be for him a just degree of
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regional administrative and political autonomy,
which is quite permissible as long as the pol
itical ideals and well-being of a higher order
are not sacrificed to the political ideals and
well-being of a lower order, but there would be
primarily "an organic heterogeneity in the very
structure of civil society, whether, for example,
it be a question of economic or certain juridical
and institutional structures.”-5- This feature of
society is directly opposed to totalitarianism.
Society would be an organic unity made up of a
diversity of groups which would possess freedom
and authority in their own sphere.

Maritain

appeals again to the writings of Yves Simon, one
of his most brilliant students, for a most apt
expression of this principle:
"The tendency to restrict the attributions
of the State,— disquieting and dangerous, as
long as it is accompanied by any sort of hos
tility regarding the temporal supremacy of
the State,— becomes purely and simply salu
tary, as soon as the just notion of the State
and its supremacy is duly re-established.
This restrictive tendency then only expresses
the fundamental idea of all philosophy of au
tonomy, to wit, that in an hierarchic whole,
every function which can be assumed by the
1. True Humanism, p. 157.
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inferior must be exercized by the latter,
under damage to the whole. For there is
more perfection in a whole, all of whose
p a r t a r e full of life and of initiative,
than in a whole whose parts are but in
struments conveying the initiative of the
superior organs of the community.nl
This principle of pluralism is expressly
sanctioned by Pius XI:
"It is an injustice, a grave evil and
a disturbance of right order for a larger
and higher organization to arrogate to it
self functions which can be performed effic
iently by smaller and lower bodies."2
Within society itself there are many groups or
smaller societies made up of individuals, and a
pluralist conception of society would give to
these groups or smaller societies within society
the fullest possible measure of autonomy.
This notion of pluralism would apply to the
economic order.

The evolution in the economic

order and the great advances in technical and
industrial organization call for a regulation of
the industrial economy which would be fundament
ally different from the regulation of the family
economy.

The very conditions of modern produc

tion demand a certain measure of collectivization
of ownership.

Under the capitalist system, we

1. Yves Simon, Notes Sur Le Federalisme Proudhonien
in Esprit, April 1, 1937.
S. Pius XI, Ouadragesimo Anno.
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have labor and capital uniting to produce, and
the more this production is speeded by indus
trial machinery, by better methods of organ
ization and by more fruitful means of finance,
the more collectivized the economy becomes.
Collectivization should not be an end in itself.
Rather, the industrial economy should subordinate
collectivization to the demands of the common
good and of man as a person.

It follows from

this that both the means and the fruits of pro
duction should belong primarily, not to the
State, but to those corporate bodies of men en
gaged in the collectivist undertaking.

These

corporate bodies, composed of both laborers and
shareholders, would be considered as moral per
sons.

Maritain suggests that eventually "a sys

tem of co-ownership is substituted for the em
ployment of workers at a wage so that money in
vested on a basis of ownership and not of money—
lending shall be subordinate and not superior to
human values.”1

Man, then, will be the master,

rather than the slave, of the machine.

The

1. Freedom in the Modern World, p. 62.
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actual government of these corporate groups sh
ould be left to the groups themselves and should
be exercised by the State only when the groups,
or individuals at the head of the groups, fail
to exercise their rights and duties fittingly,
thus inevitably impinging on the common good.
Maritain would have this same pluralist prin
ciple applied to the juridic order.

Unlike medi

eval Europe which possessed a high degree of rel
igious unity, modern civilization admits of wide
religious diversity.

These religious differences

in the midst of the same civilization give rise
to many serious problems.

Maritain cannot accept

the totalitarian solution that one single rule of
faith should be imposed on all.

This is opposed

to sound reason and to the principle of man’s per
sonal freedom in religious matters which is such
an essential part of Christianity.

He would sugg

est that the State concede to each separate rel
igious group its own juridic system based on its
own. ethical system— "it appears that one day the
legislature may be induced in mixed questions
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(matters that have at once and inseparably a
civil and religious aspect) to concede to the
several religious bodies within the State a
separate legal constitution.”!

Maritain does

not deny that there is one objective morality,
but he does believe that the legislator, who
must be concerned with the common good of a
concrete, historical people, should take into
account the actual facts of their existence and
therefore, too, their actually existing diverse
moral ideals.

In support of this he invokes

St. Thomas’ principle of the lesser evil:
’’Dicendum. quod humanum regimen derivatur
a divino regimine, et ipsum debet imitari.
Deus, autem, quamvis sit omnipotens et sumnie
bonus, permittit tamen aliqua mala fieri in
universo, quae prohibere posset, ne eis sublatis majors, bona tollerentur vel etiam pe«
jora mala sequerentur. Sic igitur et in re
gimine humano illi qui praesunt recte aliqua
mala tolerant, ne aliqua bona impediantur,
vel etiam ne aliqua mala pejora occurantur
Applying this principle, Maritain holds that
in order to avoid greater evils the governing
body could and should tolerate diverse religious
forms varying more or less from the truth:

’’ritus

1. Freedom, in the Modern World, p. 62.
2. Summa Theologioa, II-II, 10, 11.
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infidelium sunt tolerandi.'1^

These various re

ligious groups would be accorded their own Jur
idical status, adapted, on the one hand, to their
own condition, and on the other, to the general
line of legislation leading towards the virtuous
life.

The governing body should endeavor to dir

ect this diversity of forms towards the prescrip
tions of the moral law in the fullest obtainable
degree.
We have seen most of the hidden implications
of the personalist, communal, and pluralist fea
tures of Maritain’s society.

It remains for us

to distinguish clearly the spiritual and the
temporal, the Ohurch and Society, and thus to
see that Maritain’s political humanism demands
of necessity an ordered relationship of the
spiritual and the temporal, of the Church and
Society.

Civilization, or culture (the two terms

will be considered as synonomous) has been aptly
defined by Maritain as ’’that flowering which
gives space for a rightly human life; is concer
ned not only with the necessary material develop
ment which permits the leading of a proper life
1. Summa Theologica, II-II, 10, 11.
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here below, but also and primarily with m a n ’s
moral development, the development of those spir
itual and practical (artistic and ethical) ac
tivities which rightly merit the name of human
progress.”1
thing.

Civilization, then, is a natural

It is the fruit of an essential impulse

of human nature, but in itself it is a work of
the spirit and of freedom.

This development is

not only physical and material but also and
primarily spiritual and moral.

This does not

mean, however, that religion is a tpart ' of civ
ilization, as was the case in pagan antiquity
when a particular religion was identified with
a particular civilization or culture, but rather
religion, simply because there is a God Who
created everything out of nothing, transcends
all civilization and every culture; it is uni
versal; it is not a part of man, nor of the world,
nor of a culture, nor of civilization.
Culture or civilization, then, since they sire
directed to an earthly end, must be directed and
subordinated to the eternal life which is the end
1. True Humanism, p. 88
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of religion, and must strive therefore to make
accessible to all the attainment of this higher
eternal end.

This does not mean that culture

and civilization are merely instruments in the
hands of religion, as was the case, to a certain
extent, in the Middle Ages.

Rather, they have

their own specific end, namely, the good human
life of men here on earth.

Because they are

concerned, however, with the things of time,
they suffer the vicissitudes of time— "the or
der of culture or civilization appears then as
the order of the things of time, as the temporal
order. **•*On the other hand, religion, concerned as it
is with God and with an eternal life which is
none other than a participation in the intimate
life of God Himself, constitutes the spiritual
order which, of its very nature, transcends the
spiritual order.

If the spiritual order vivifies

and seeks to elevate the temporal order, it does
so not as a part of the temporal order but in
virtue of its transcendence and independence in
1* True Humanism, p. 90.
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regard to the temporal order.
This distinction between the spiritual and
the temporal is essentially Christian and only
has its full force and meaning for a Christian—
"Render therefore to Caesar the things that are
Caesar’s; and to God, the things that are God’s.’’^The distinction, however, very valuable in itself
for its spiritual and cultural significance, does
present some serious problems for solution.
Maritain considers the first of these problems
to be the problem of the Kingdom of God.

The con

cept 'of the Kingdom of God is not a social con
cept; it is a supra-temporal concept.

To realize

the Kingdom of God is to realize union in the
mystical body of Christ.

What part is to be

played in the attainment of the Kingdom of God
by the spiritual and the temporal order?

What

are we to think of the world and of the earthly
city in regard to the Kingdom of God?
In true scholastic fashion, Maritain considers
here, too, the most important erroneous positions
in regard to this problem.

First of all, there

1. St. Matthew, Ch. 22, v. 21.
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is the satanooratlc notion of the world as the
kingdom of the devil, as the domain of evil, as
creation abandoned by God into the hands of the
devil against whom we can only bear witness in
the midst of perdition.

This perverted notion

had its origin in the Protestant Reformation
and appears today in a slightly more concealed
form among the disciples of Karl Barth.

The

rationalism of Descartes, embodying his scission
between nature and grace, reached the same con
clusion.
The second erroneous position is that the
world itself is divine— the world in its tem
poral existence is already and fully the King
dom of God.

This error has its seeds both in

the East and in the West.

In the East, this

idea has a primarily mystical nature, and, as
such, is known as a theophanio notion of the
v/orld.

Many of these heretical mystics go so

far as to claim that, since the world itself
is divine and already the Kingdom of God, man
should be free from all law or constraint,
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regardless of whether these laws or constraints
emanate from God, from nature, or from reason.
In the West, this error has a primarily polit
ical nature, and, as such, is known as a theo
cratic notion of the world.

This would have

the world, at least in appearance and in the
organization of social life, the effective re
alization of the Kingdom of God,

It is clearly

opposed to the explicit teaching of Christ:
”My kingdom is not of this world. f,l

Neither

aspect of this error had any real formal re
cognition in the Middle Ages, although we do
find traces of it in certain extremist theolog
ians who believed that the Pope was supreme in
the temporal as well as in the spiritual order.
The third erroneous position is primarily
a modern one--the error of detached or anthropocentric humanism.

This believes that the

•

world is given over to nature and to man, with
out any reference to the sacred or to any divine
transcendence.

Either spiritual values are denied

completely, or, if they are affirmed, they are
1. St. John. Ch. 18, v. 56.
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said to have no relation with, or bearing on,
temporal values.

The world is completely

’’detached” from God; man is the center of the
world.

All things take their ’’cue” from man.

Ludwig Feuerbach, a disciple of Hegel, gave
philosophic expression, and therefore fresh im
petus, to this anthropocentric humanism which
really stems from the Renaissance.

Gilson,

quoting from Feuerbach’s Essence of Christian
ity, attributes to Feuerbach the statement that
”God has not created man in his own image and
likeness: the worship of man under the name of
God is the very essence of religion.”-*- This
idea permeates every sphere of modern thought—
art, literature, history, economics, sociology,
etc.

T.S. Eliot, a discerning critic, denounces

its presence in the field of literature:
’’What I do wish to affirm is that the
whole of modern literature is corrupted by
what I call Secularism, that it is simply
unaware of, simply cannot understand the
meaning of, the primacy of the supernatural
over the natural life; of something which I
assume to be our primary concern.
Maritain resolves this problem of the Kingdom
1. E. Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Exper
ience , p. E81.
2. T.S. Eliot, Essays Ancient and Modern, p. 110.
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of God by harmonizing the elements of truth la
tent in the three erroneous positions outlined
above:
"The truth about the world and the ear
thly city is that they are the kingdom at
once of man, of G-od, and of the devil....
The world belongs to God by right of creat
ion; to the devil by right of conquest, be
cause of sin; to Christ by right of victory
over the first conqueror, by his Passion.
The task of the Christian in this world is
to dispute his domain with the devil and
wrench it from him. He must strive to this
end in which he wall never fully succeed
while time endures."1
History is ambivalent.

The spiritual order tends

towards God alone, w/hile the temporal order is a
divided domain, leading at one and the same time
to God and to evil.
Another problem presented by the distinction
between the spiritual and the temporal is the
problem of the temporal mission of the Christian.
The secular failure of the Christian in the mod
ern -world must be admitted.

In the medieval

Christian order, spiritual principles acted in
a large measure as a leaven in the temporal order.
With the coming of modern times, the world, with its
1. True Humanism, p. 10E.
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anthropocentric humanism, has become progress
ively detached from Christ.

In the economic

order, this detached humanism has taken the
form of Capitalism.

In the wake of this new

movement, Christians as a whole have stood
idly by, offering very little resistance,

mat

is the reason for this secular failure of the
Christian in the modern world?

The chief rea

son belongs to the intellectual order— Christians,
both in fact and in spirit, are not aware that
the principles of Christianity must be realized
not only in the life of souls but in the socio
temporal order as well.

In what Maritain calls

the "reflective age"l after medieval Christen
dom, art and science and philosophy and the
State became very conscious of themselves, but
"there was no similar study of the social order
as such or of the essential nature of its being."2
The spirit of Christianity was present in many
members of the Christian world, but it was not
generally understood that this spirit was to be
applied to the social order.
1. Freedom in the Modern World, p. 123.
2. Ibid.
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The Christian has a very definite role to
play in the work of transforming the social
system.

A social, political and economic

philosophy must be elaborated— a philosophy
which m i l not rest content with universal
principles, but which must be capable of com
ing down to the details of concrete realiz
ation.

There must be an integration to ethics

of things in the domain of sociology, politics
and economics.

Universal principles must be

applied to the social order as well as to the
life of the individual.

The Christian, how

ever, cannot effect a vitally Christian trans
formation of the temporal order in the same
way as one effects other temporal transfor
mations and revolutions.

Christians must re

new within themselves a profound spiritual and
moral life and within society itself the moral
ideas that govern the life of the social body
as such, and then they should do everything in
their power to have these awakened and vital
principles act as a leaven in the social,econ
omic and political world.

The need for this
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intelligent awareness of our obligations as
Christians to the temporal order is very poig
nantly expressed by Maritain:
"The Christian body has at such a time
as ours two opposite dangers that it needs
to avoid: the danger of seeking sanctity
only in the desert, and the danger of for
getting the need of the desert for sanctity;
the danger of enclosing in the cloister of
the interior life and of private virtue the
heroism it ought to share among mankind...”1
A vitally Christian social renewal will be fun
damentally a moral renewal.

The fruits of this

moral renewal in the personal lives of Christians
will then be applied to the temporal order, to
the world, and to secular civilization and cul
ture .
The problems arising from the distinction
between the spiritual and the temporal— the pro
blem of the Kingdom of God and the problem of
the temporal role of the Christian— are thus
solved.

Briefly, in review, the Church is al

ready the Kingdom of God in the spiritual order,
but still only an approach to the true Kingdom
of God which is outside time and history.

The

world, or the temporal order, belongs at one
1* Freedom in the Modern World, p. 145.
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and the same time to G-od, to mankind and to the
devil.

The Christian must strive for some pro

portionate realization of universal transcending
principles— principles ennobled by the Gospel—
in the social, economic and political order.
We have presented Maritain’s metaphysical
criticism of the major social and political sol
utions in the modern world.

His own political

humanism, based on the nature of man as an in
dividual and as a person, is personalist, communal, pluralist„ and founded on the ordered relat
ionship of the spiritual and the temporal.

For

many, indeed for most, of his ideas, he is in
debted to Aristotle and to St. Thomas Aquinas,
but this does not mean that he preaches a return
to the social and political organisms of the
ancient or medieval world.

These eternal prin

ciples do not preclude the possibility of orig
inal insights into, and ingenious applications
to, changing historical circumstances.

Maritain’s

grasp of the pressing need of a largely indiv
idualistic world for a deep sense of the dignity
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of the human person; his more precise formulat
ion of the notion of the common good and of
final ends in distinct genera; his emphasis on
terminal freedom or freedom of autonomy; his
more extensive application of the principle of
pluralism to the economic and juridic order;
and his clear defining of the relationship bet
ween the spiritual and the temporal;— all these
contributions justify us in concluding that
Maritain is in his own merits an original and
creative writer, deserving of the serious study
of all social and political thinkers.
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